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The aim of this paper is to contribute to the interpretation of the factors that have led to 
the fall in the labour share in Europe from a non-orthodox perspective, drawing on Classical 
and  Keynesian  traditions.  It  focuses  first  on  the  Italian  experience  and  then  extends  the 
analysis to other major countries in the Euro area: Germany, France and Spain. 
The paper examines the role of relative price changes between business sector services 
and manufacturing in affecting the labour share and real wages in the two sectors.  It then 
proceeds to historical and statistical analysis of the set of factors that have affected real wage 
growth in manufacturing and finds that institutional changes, unemployment, employment  
growth  and  changes  in  product  per  worker  in  terms  of  the  consumer  price  index,  taken 




In  the  industrial  countries,  the  last  few  decades  have  witnessed  a  major  shift  in  income 
distribution away from wages and towards non-labour incomes. Non orthodox economists 
(economists, that is, who draw on Classical, Marxian and Keynesian traditions) have seen in 
this  phenomenon  a  potential  source  of  trouble  for  these  economies,  owing  to  its  adverse 
                                                 
* I whish to thank Dr Davide Zurlo for his help in testing the regression analysis reported  in tables 1 and 2, 
footnotes 18 & 21 and the Appendix. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference The Global 
Economic Crisis: New Perspectives on The Critique of Economic Theory and Policy held in Siena in January 
2010.   2 
impact  on  aggregate  demand.  The  latter  impact  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the 
mounting indebtedness of the private sector ever since the 1980s, particularly in the US, 
which however contributed to the increasing financial fragility of the system right up to the 
current crisis (Foster and Magdoff, 2009; Barba and Pivetti, 2008, among others). The view 
that  current  income  distribution  represents  a  structural  problem  for  advanced  economies 
because of its effects on aggregate demand formation has been recently subscribed to also by 
influential  mainstream  economists
1.  Though  inconsistent  with  their  theoretical  views  and 
academic  production,
2  this  attention  to  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  changes  in  income 
distribution is a welcome novelty. Despite its magnitude, the phenomenon had been largely 
ignored by academics and major institutions alike, and only in the last few years have reports 
on the matter been produced by the IMF (2007a, 2007b) and Oecd (2008). 
This work expands on two earlier papers (Levrero and Stirati, 2005; 2006). The aim is to 
contribute to the interpretation of the factors that have led to changes in income shares in the 
European  context,  by  focussing  first  on  the  Italian  experience  (which  is  believed  to  be 
representative, in some respects, of the situation of the ‘weaker’ economies in the European 
Union), and then extending the analysis to other major countries in the euro area. 
The analysis of the Italian case shows that the decline in the wage share in the business 
sector  as  a  whole
3  results  from  rather  different  trends  in  its  two  major  components: 
manufacturing and services. The decline has in fact been much more marked in the latter; in 
addition, the proportion between the consumer price index and the sector deflator moved in 
opposite directions, thus reinforcing the tendency towards the fall of the wage share in the 
service sector, while countervailing it in manufacturing (section 3). The paper thus proceeds 
by examining the possible causes i) of the changes in relative prices between manufacturing 
and services and ii) of the trends in real wages vis-à-vis productivity (sections 3 & 4). One of 
the  points  made  is  that  the  change  in  relative  prices  may  be  a  factor  affecting  workers 
bargaining strength, since manufacturing is the leading sector in wage determination. It is 
then argued that one of the causes of relative price changes may have been the tendency 
towards a real appreciation of the exchange rate – a factor that may be common to other 
countries experiencing a nominal fixed exchange rate regime or monetary union together with 
higher inflation or lower productivity growth than major competing countries within the euro 
area. The evidence concerning other major European economies (Germany, France and Spain) 
                                                 
1 Fitoussi and Stiglitz (2009), Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) 
2 See Brancaccio (2011)   3 
is consistent with the role of real exchange rates in influencing prices and margins over labour 
costs per unit of product in manufacturing vis-à-vis business sector services. Also, it is found 
that labour market variables tend to be important, albeit in different degrees, in explaining real 
wage trends in the countries examined (sections 4 and 5) 
The approach taken here to the analysis of changes in income distribution differs from the 
one  generally  adopted  in  mainstream  literature  on  the  topic,  and  requires  therefore  some 
clarification before proceeding in the analysis, which is done in the following section. 
 
2. Some Pointers to the Theoretical Background 
 
Up to perhaps 20 or so years ago one could have opposed to the traditional neoclassical 
(marginalist)  theory  of  distribution  in  terms  of  demand  and  supply  functions  another 
alternative explanation, rooted in the old classical economists and Marx, and based on the 
bargaining position of the parties (in turn susceptible to being influenced by a number of 
economic and socio-institutional factors),
4 without fear of misunderstanding. Today however 
claiming  to  follow  the  second  of  these  approaches  would  most  likely  give  rise  to  some 
misapprehension. This is so because in the last few decades there has been a widespread 
acceptance of New Keynesian models which have supplemented the traditional analysis based 
on demand and supply functions with qualifications and additions that assign a seemingly 
significant role to the bargaining strength of the parties and a number of institutional factors 
in affecting income distribution. Although this has changed the language much more than the 
actual substance of the analyses carried out by means of these models vis-à-vis the traditional 
neoclassical approach, it creates an apparent likeness with the second of the two approaches 
mentioned above, which calls for some clarification. 
For the purpose of the topic discussed here, it is particularly important to point out that 
New-Keynesian models retain the principle of factor substitutability that is at the core of the 
marginalist tradition, so that in these models a fall in the “bargaining power” of the workers 
would lead to a fall in the equilibrium real wage rate and, accordingly, to a rise in the labour 
to  capital  and  labour  to  output  ratios  determined  by  optimization  in  consumption  and 
production.
5 This is particularly important in the context of the explanation of changes in 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Business sector data are obtained, following the usual procedure, by subtracting Public administration; 
Education; Health; Social, recreational and other personal services from the data for the entire economy. 
4 For an overview of this approach see Stirati, 1992 and 1999. 
5 This is the case when, in the familiar model constituted by a price equation and a bargained wage equation, the 
former is decreasing in the real wage-employment space because it reflects a decreasing marginal product of   4 
income  shares,  since  if  there  is  factor  substitution,  a  fall  in  wages  (or  in  the  proportion 
between wage and product per worker), owing to the increase in the above-mentioned ratios, 
would probably give rise to small or nil (depending on the values of elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital) changes in income shares. This, by itself, creates an underlying 
difficulty in all mainstream attempts at explaining the observed changes in income shares, 
which  are  usually  overcome  by  attributing  such  changes  to  labour-saving  technical 
innovation.  These  technical  changes  are  however  hard  to  identify  empirically,  and  the 
methods  adopted  in  applied  works  have  been  criticized,  among  other  things,  as  often 
amounting  to  assuming  that  changes  that  cannot  be  otherwise  explained  according  to  the 
theory must be due to technical innovations of the appropriate type (Stockhammer, 2009: 19-
22). 
In addition, in New-Keynesian models, equilibrium unemployment (the nairu) and real 
wages  (given  productivity)  must  vary  in  the  same  direction  -  in  contrast  with  empirical 
observation.
6 In the long run, according to this approach, growth is led by supply factors 
along a path of equilibrium unemployment, so that statements such as that quoted at the 
beginning with respect to the structural problems that may be caused by lack of aggregate 
demand are inconsistent with the theory as expounded in textbooks and academic journals, 
whereby deviations of actual from potential output due to changes in aggregate demand are 
transitory, and do not affect the long term path of the economy. 
Besides  the  role  of  labour-saving  technical  innovations,  another,  more  appealing, 
explanation of changes in income distribution refers to the role of globalization in increasing 
unskilled labour supplies through various channels (immigration, off-shoring of intermediate 
production, imports of products from emerging economies). Again, however, when this is 
treated within mainstream economic models that retain the principle of factor substitution, the 
expected results are at variance with facts in some important respects. In particular, while 
according to mainstream trade theory, globalization should lead to a fall in relative unskilled 
labour incomes in advanced economies, it should also improve the wages of unskilled versus 
skilled  workers  in  emerging  ones,  a  phenomenon  which  is  not  generally  observed  (IMF, 
2007a: 176). 
                                                                                                                                                       
labour. If labour marginal product is assumed constant, as is done in some textbook expositions, a change in the 
bargaining strength of the workers would shift the bargained wage equation, determining lower equilibrium 
unemployment, but  no changes (given productivity) in the equilibrium wage. In this case therefore the model 
could not be used to explain changes in distribution.  
6 See for example Stockhammer et al, 2007; Lopez and Silva, 2009. See also the empirical estimates in the 
present paper (tables 1 and 2).   5 
In  contrast  with  mainstream  literature,  the  Classical-Keynesian  approach  taken  here 
implies that there is no necessary causal relation of the traditional type going from income 
distribution to the level of employment and unemployment, nor any notion of a tendency of 
the economic system towards potential output. While income distribution is regarded as the 
result of the bargaining strength of the parties, output and employment levels depend, even in 
the long run, on the principle of effective demand.
7 Accordingly, the effects of changes in 
income distribution on employment mainly work through their influence on the propensity to 
consume and aggregate demand. Profound differences with the mainstream approach derive 
from this with regard to the themes discussed above.  
In  the  first  place,  according  to  this  approach,  a  change  in  the  bargaining  strength  of 
workers is likely to affect real wages, and since there are no assumptions of the traditional 
type  concerning  factor  substitution,  the  effects  on  income  shares  may  be  significant. 
Concerning  the  roles  of  technical  innovation  or  globalization,  their  impact  on  income 
distribution in the present approach would have to be conceptualized in a different way. For 
example, one would expect that intense technical change would affect bargaining and income 
distribution to a large extent through workers’ displacement and higher unemployment,
8 and 
not, in contrast with mainstream theory, by changing the ratio between the wage rate and the 
rate of profits which is consistent with potential output equilibrium. Similar considerations 
apply  with  regard  to  globalization  processes.  Competition  from  emerging  economies  on 
product markets, off-shoring, immigration, can be expected to affect the bargaining position 
of  workers  in  advanced  countries  by  increasing  job  losses  and  unemployment,  or  by 
determining a threat that jobs will be lost as a consequence of higher wages, while at the same 
time  not  necessarily  improving  the  relative  position  of  unskilled  workers  in  emerging 
economies,  owing  to  large  labour  reserves  and/or  to  general  political  and  institutional 
conditions in those countries. In addition, one could argue that the impact of globalization 
works  through  other  channels  as  well;  of  particular  importance  are  the  limitations  on 
macroeconomic policies that are imposed by free capital mobility, which can then affect the 
formation of aggregate demand and employment growth. All in all, it thus would appear that 
many of the factors that are likely to affect income distribution, leaving aside institutional 
                                                 
7 The main analytical premise of these views is to be found in the criticism to the principle of factor substitution 
(Garegnani, 1970). In contemporary macro-models the tendency of the economy to potential output is generally 
attributed to the so called real balance effect and “Keynes effect”. However the former cannot by itself be 
regarded as capable of ensuring that tendency, while the inverse relationship between aggregate investment and 
the interest rate (the Keynes effect) must in the end rely precisely on factor substitution (see Petri, 2004, chapt 
7).   6 
changes concerning labour market regulation or union organization, are likely to affect the 
bargaining position of workers to some extent through their impact on employment growth 
and  unemployment.  Finally,  productivity  growth,  which  in  mainstream  approaches  is 
regarded as a determinant of wage growth, in the approach taken here may have  the role of 
providing a potential space or constraint for a wage growth not affecting the rate of profit – 
but the space may not be filled or the constraint overridden, depending on the bargaining 
position of the workers. 
The approach just described evidently has consequences for applied analysis since, while 
we can expect that certain variables will affect the bargaining position of the workers and 
income distribution, this is not expected necessarily to hold in all periods or in all countries – 
for example, the impact of the unemployment level on workers’ bargaining position may vary 
according to institutional or social conditions - and the analysis of data is not aimed, as it is so 
often with mainstream works, at finding results that fit a particular model, but rather has the 
purpose  of  contributing  to  historical  reconstruction  and,  if  possible,  forming  taxonomies, 
which may then enhance our understanding of economic phenomena. 
 
3. The Italian Case: Sector Income Shares and the Role of Relative Prices 
 
 3.1 Accounting breakdown of the changes in the wage share: manufacturing and services. 
It is a well known fact that the aggregate wage share fell in most advanced countries since the 
late 1970s, early 1980s – a fall that was particularly marked in Italy (see below, section 5). In 
principle, from an accounting point of view, a change in income shares might be due to an 
increase in the ratio of the value of capital to the value of output (due for example to technical 
changes or changes in output composition), with a given rate of return on capital – that is, 
without any changes in distribution actually taking place.
9 In Levrero and Stirati (2005: 408-
                                                                                                                                                       
8 Of course technical change may also affect the bargaining position of the workers owing to the changes taking 
place in the organization of the labour process. 
9 Of course much caution is needed in regarding the actual rate of return on capital found in the data as an 
indication of the trend in the profit rate for several reasons. Some have to do with the quality of the data, since it 
is well known that statistical series for capital stock and amortization quotas are very difficult to construct and 
may not be reliable and, for circulating capital, there are no data concerning the actual time span for which it is 
advanced. Other difficulties are conceptual. The actual return on capital depends on the degree of utilization and 
is calculated on the entire capital stock, while in economic theory the rate of profit is defined as the return on 
normally utilized capital and on best practice techniques. Non reported data show however that, as far as the 
degree of utilization is concerned, taking into account the data on the degree of utilization of capacity in 
manufacturing  does not significantly alter the time profile of the rate of return on capital, though of course it 
affects its level (Levrero and Stirati, 2005, pp 411-413 and fn 14).   7 
14), however, we show that the rate of return on capital has indeed increased in parallel with 
the  fall  in  the  wage  share  in  the  private  sector  of  the  economy  as  a  whole  and  in  most 
industries.
10 
In the following, the focus will be on the wage share trends in the two main macro-sectors 
of the economy: manufacturing and business sector services.
11 The differences between these 
two sectors can be highlighted through an exercise of accounting breakdown of the changes in 
the wage shares, and point to an interesting phenomenon, the sharp change in the relative 
prices between these two sectors. This, it will be argued, may have had a causal role in 
determining the observed changes in income distribution. 
The wage share calculated here is the adjusted wage share, imputing to all employed 
workers the average income of employees in the same sector while the remaining incomes of 
self-employed workers are consequently imputed as part of the operating surplus. 
From an accounting point of view the wage share can be thus broken down: 
 
Qli = Wi Lti/VAi!
 
Lti/VAi = 1/ qi Pi 
 
wi = Wi/Pw 
 
Qli = (wi/qi)Pw/Pi 
 
Where Qli is the wage share in sector i, Lt  is employment,  VA the value added, wi and Wi 
are respectively real and nominal labour compensation (including all taxes and contributions 
paid  by  employees  and  employers),  q  is  real  value  added  per  employee,    Pw/Pi  is  the 
proportion between the cost of living index and the implicit deflator of sector i. 
From the last of the identities above, the percentage changes in the wage share are given 
by the sum:  
 
                                                 
10 In the same work it was shown that the change in income share remains very significant even when we take 
out the real estate sector, where the income accruing as rents to house property has been increasing sharply. It 
was also shown that, from an accounting point of view, the change cannot be attributed to changes in output 
composition towards sectors exhibiting a lower wage share, nor to changes in the composition of the employed 
labour force between employees and self-employed. 
11 See footnote 2 for definition.   8 
var % Qli = var% wri/qi + var % Pw/Pi  + “residual”
12 
 
The negative trend of the wage share is much wider in the service sector (figure 1), and 
the results of this breakdown for manufacturing and business sector services are shown in 
figures 2 and 3. The trends in the two sectors result from a different combination of the two 
terms of the breakdown: while the proportion between real compensation and productivity has 
been  declining  in  both,  in  manufacturing  this  has  been  counter-balanced  by  the  marked 
increase in the second term, while in the service sector the latter tended to fall, reinforcing the 





                                                 




Since services have a significant weight – about 50% - in the consumption basket, the 
change in the ratio of cost of living and manufacturing deflator is, to a significant extent, due 
precisely to the change in the ratio between the deflator of services vis-à-vis manufacturing 
(figure 4).  
   10 
 
Before considering the causes of this change in relative prices in the next paragraph, it 
may be observed that the increase in the cost of wage goods relative to manufacturing output, 
in a context in which wage-setting in the business sector as a whole substantially depends on 
wage  bargaining  in  manufacturing  (see  note  13  below),  may  be  a  factor  in  affecting  the 
outcomes of the bargaining: with rising costs of wage goods, keeping the wage constant in 
purchasing power would imply an increase in the product wage in manufacturing, and hence, 
other things being equal, a fall in the profit rate. 
 
3.2     Interpretations of the change in relative prices. 
The change in relative prices between services and manufacturing is suggestive of a “Baumol 
effect”:  the  tendency  for  productivity  to  rise  faster  in  manufacturing  than  in  service 
production would cause a significant long-term change in relative prices between the two 
sectors. This, however, appears to be only part of the story. The ratio of prices has changed 
more than can be accounted for by changes in relative productivity and unit costs. As is 
implicit in the different trends in wage shares, and shown in figure 5, the margin over labour 
costs per unit of product has increased much more in the service sector than in manufacturing 
since  the  mid  1980s,  while  also  the  returns  on  capital  exhibit  a  similar  relative  increase 
(Levrero & Stirati, 2005: 408-14). 
   11 
 
 
In the Italian literature, this phenomenon has been generally interpreted as the result of 
‘monopoly  rents’  in  protected  industries.  While  this  can  certainly  be  a  factor  in  the 
explanation, it fails to explain why the described changes in relative prices and margins were 
not taking place during the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, and were interrupted between 
1992 and 1996, when major devaluations of the lira occurred. This timing draws attention to 
the role of the real appreciation of the exchange rate. On the other hand, since the early 1990s, 
privatizations had been carried out in some industries within the service sector (Financial 
intermediation, Transports and communications), which may also have affected relative price 
movements. 
As far as appreciation of the real exchange rate is concerned, Italy has displayed a higher 
inflation  rate  than  core  European  countries  like  France  and  Germany,  so  that  the  fixed 
exchange rate regime adopted with varying intensity and rigour since the beginning of the 
1980s, and the introduction of the euro later on, may have led to strong pressure being exerted 
on the manufacturing sector to keep the rate of price increase under check, a pressure from 
which the service sector was largely protected (Levrero and Stirati 2005, pp 419-26; 2004: 
79).  In  the  last  part  of  the  period  the  pressure  on  manufacturing  prices  may  have  been 
intensified by competition in product markets from emerging economies. 
Thus,  it  may  be  assumed  that  every  real  appreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  forces  a 
reduction in price increases, first in the sector exposed to international competition in product   12 
markets (manufacturing), and only subsequently affecting prices in the other sectors of the 
economy through input-output relations, cost of living, and lower inertial inflation. This tends 
to determine a change in relative prices and re-distribution of profits between sectors that can 
be described as follows: 
The money price equations in manufacturing and services are: 
 
1)  Pi = Wli + (1+ri) (Piaii + Psasi) 
 
 2)  Ps = Wls + (1+rs) (Piais + Psass) 
 
Where W is the uniform money wage, l is the labour coefficient, r is the rate of profit in 
each sector and a indicate the production coefficients. 
We can than take as numeraire a composite basket of manufacturing and service sector 
products: 
3)  Pw = !iPi + !sPs ;      with    !i + !s = 1 
 
And thus define the relative prices in the two industries as: 
 
4)  pi = Pi/Pw;      ps = Ps/Pw 
 
The  relative  price  equations  in  terms  of  the  numeraire  on  the  assumption  of  a 
competitively determined uniform rate of profit  r* are therefore: 
 
 5)  p*i = [wli + (1+r*i) p*s asi]/ [1- (1+r* i)aii] 
 
 6)  p*s = [ wls + (1+r*s)p*i ais] /[1- (1+r* s)ass] 
 
If “external pressures” determine a reduction in the rate of growth of Pi relative to Ps, and 
Pi/Ps  falls, then ps rises and pi falls – with given w, this necessarily implies rs>r*s in equation 
6) and vice versa in equation 5) – a result that thus emerges, at least for the short run, with no 
need to refer to monopolistic conditions.
13 
                                                 
13 With free capital mobility, a situation of different returns on capital could not persist forever, and we should 
expect reactions to such disparity, which may be of different types, such as  innovative behaviour or de-
localization in manufacturing aimed at restoring higher profitability, or reduction of investments in 
manufacturing and the re-orientation of investments towards service industries. On the other hand, barriers to   13 
In Italy, ‘redistribution’ of profits among sectors also appears to have originated from 
price  policies  and  privatisations  in  the  public  utilities.  This  partly  affects  the  aggregate 
business sector services considered here, which includes transport and communications and 
the financial sector, which have undergone processes of privatization and transformation in 
companies, and which exhibit a significant increase in margins and returns on capital (the 
gross rate of return on fixed capital has increased about five points since 1993 in Transport 
and communications and ten points since 2000 in Financial intermediation). It also affects 
another sector not included in this aggregate, but which certainly has significant effect on the 
cost  of  living  index,  namely  the  Production  and  distribution  of  energy,  which  has  also 
experienced a continuous steep trend towards increasing margins over unit labour costs and 
returns on capital since 1993 (the latter increased almost ten points since the mid - 80s). 
While it is generally thought that privatizations and liberalizations will lead to a reduction in 
prices by increasing productivity in the privatised concerns, it has generally been overlooked 
that an opposite effect will derive from the fact that, in privatised firms, there must emerge a 
remuneration of capital that previously might have been absent or lower than in the business 
sector. This of course will be particularly important in exerting an upward pressure on prices 
when the privatised activity requires a high value of capital per unit of product.   
In general, for a given real wage and given methods of production, the emerging of a 
normal profit rate (i.e. a remuneration of capital equal to that normally earned in competitive 
business activities) in the privatized sectors, determines a reduction of the overall profit rate.
14  
In order to simply illustrate this point we can consider the usual price equations, now 
taking for the sake of simplicity as numeraire the price of manufacturing products: Pi = 1. 
Consider an initial situation in which the services industry is public with, for the sake of 
simplicity, r = 0, and that subsequently it is privatised, so that, in order for the investment to 
be remunerative, the rate of profit must become the same as the one earned in manufacturing. 
With the methods of production unchanged and the real wage given in terms of the product of 
industry, the service sector relative price equations will be: 
 
Public services         1)    ps = (wls + ais)/(1-ass) 
Privatized  services                                 1’)   p’s = [wls + ais(1+r)]/[1-ass(1+r)] 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
entry in the latter, and the re-iteration over time of external pressures on manufacturing prices, may contribute to 
render a disparity in profitability rather persistent over time. 
14 See also Cesaratto, 2007.   14 
 
and the increase in price after privatisation (in other words, that p’s> ps) is evident.  
If we now look at the manufacturing price equation, under our assumptions, we have: 
 
2)      1= wli + (1+r)(aii + psasi) 
 
with given w an increase in ps must cause a fall in the uniform rate of profit r in equation 2) in 
the system composed by equations 1’) and 2) vis-à- vis the system consisting of equations 1) 
and 2). 
This result means that in actual fact, privatizations will tend to cause a harshening of the 
conflict over income distribution, and may therefore result in a fall not of the profit rate, but 
of the proportion between real wage and product per worker, or any intermediate outcome, 
according to the circumstances affecting the bargaining strength of the parties.  
 
3.3 Changes in relative prices and the bargaining position of workers 
The  role  of  changes  in  relative  prices  in  affecting  income  shares  in  manufacturing  and 
services shown by the above breakdown exercise is merely an accounting one – it highlights a 
potentially interesting phenomenon, but says nothing about any causal connection. However, 
it is reasonable to assume that the trend in real wages in the private sector from 1979 on may 
also  have  stemmed  from  a  growing  relative  disadvantage  of  the  sector  exposed  to 
international competition in product markets associated with changes in the exchange rate 
regime. Over the whole period considered, manufacturing was the leading sector in wage 
bargaining,
15 and the situation described in the previous section contributed to harshening 
distributive conflict precisely in this area of production. Caught as it was between costs rising 
more than in competing countries and the restraints imposed on price increases deriving from 
the  fixed  exchange  rate  and  the  Italian  position  in  international  product  markets, 
manufacturing experienced a deterioration in its relative terms of profitability. Unions in this 
sector, and hence by extension in the whole of the business sector, thus encountered growing 
                                                 
15 This leading role is shown, on the one hand, in the sensitivity of contract wages in manufacturing to specific 
conditions in the sector (in particular, employment growth in the sector), which is not found in business sector 
services, and on the other hand  in the very strong correlation between rates of variation of remuneration in the 
two sectors (Levrero & Stirati 2004: 72; 2006: 95).    15 
difficulties  in  obtaining  monetary  wage  increases  capable  of  defending  purchasing  power 
from price increases in sectors not exposed to international competition.
16 
To better illustrate this point, we can look at wages and productivity in Metal-working 
industry, where workers’ union has been particularly strong and militant. Figures 6a and 6b 
show that in this industry, increases in gross real compensation in terms of product price 
roughly match the increases in value added per employee; yet, if we look at real compensation 
in purchasing power terms, the gap with productivity is very wide. 
                                                 
16 From some points of view, the situation described here may present some similarities to the one analysed by 
Ricardo when he perceives an increase in the cost of agricultural wage goods as a cause, with a given real wage, 
of the reduction in the rate of profit in the industrial sector in favour of rents.   16 
 
In the following section we shall discuss real wage trends and their possible causes, thus 
also testing the role of the changes in relative prices in affecting real wage trends. 
 
4. The Italian Case: Trends in Real Wages 
 
We have seen above that the fall in the ratio between real compensation (in terms of the 
consumer price index) and productivity has contributed to the decline in the wage share both 
in manufacturing and services. While for the purpose of the present paper productivity growth 
can be regarded as exogenous, some assessment will be attempted of the causes of the decline 
in wage growth. The focus will be on manufacturing wages (real compensation), owing to   17 
their role in determining wage trends in the rest of the business sector; simple observation of 
their levels over time (figure 7) reveals that growth accelerated in 1969 and 1970, when rank 
and file union militancy was very strong, and remained outstanding until 1976 (the averege 
annual  growth  rate  between  1969  and  1978  is  7%),  followed  by  a  period  of  growth 
interruption and then by much more moderate growth until 1992 (the averege growth rate 
1978-92 is 1,9%). From 1993 until the end of the period wages tend to stagnate, with an 




The  changes  taking  place  in  the  late  1970s-early  1980s  and  in  1992  are  very  clearly 
associated with institutional changes.
17 In 1992 a formal change in national wage-setting took 
place, entailing a complete dismantling of automatic wage indexation to the cost of living 
index (scala mobile), which was substituted by a system of money wage increases at national 
level  based  on  ‘planned’  or  target  inflation,  with  subsequent  recouping  of  the  difference 
between target and actual inflation de facto subject to discretional bargaining between the 
parties.  Gains  in  productivity  were  supposed  to  be  redistributed  to  workers  by  firm-level 
bargaining, which however remained very limited, affecting a minority of workers employed 
in larger firms. On the other hand, in 1991 incentives were approved that reduced the costs of 
short-term contracts for young workers (contratti di formazione–lavoro), and later on, in 1997 
and 2001, new forms of flexible, short-term employment contracts were introduced.  
                                                 
17 For a  more detailed discussion see Levrero and Stirati, 2006.   18 
The end of 1970s-beginning of 1980s phase is a complex one. Along with the changes in 
the  macroeconomic  international  context,  in  Italy  there  was  along  with  a  more  moderate 
attitude on the part of the unions, a weakening in union rank and file militancy associated 
with  processes  of  restructuring  and  employment  reduction  in  larger  firms,  followed  by  a 
major union defeat in 1980, which marked a turning point in labour relations. It also was a 
period of great political turmoil, which saw the failure of the communist party’s political 
project to become part of a wider government coalition. Macroeconomic policies changed, 
including a new exchange rate regime involving real appreciation of the lira, while later on, in 
1984 there was a reduction in the degree of coverage against price increases provided by the 
indexation system (Levrero and Stirati, 2004: 78-80). 
Such institutional changes appear to be able to account, prima facie, for the observed 
changes in real wages trends. It is legitimate however to wonder which other factors may have 
had a role, if any, in addition to those institutional changes. Not only this, but also whether the 
latter were in turn triggered, or at least made possible, by other underlying factors, or whether 
such factors had a role in rendering those changes effective in curbing workers’ bargaining 
power and wage growth. From this point of view some obvious candidates are labour market 
variables such as the unemployment rate, which had been on the rise since the mid-seventies, 
employment  growth  in  manufacturing  and  productivity  growth.  In  the  case  of  the  latter 
however, the previous analysis shows that comparing the real wage in terms of the cost of 
living index with the real product per worker as calculated by the implicit industry deflator 
may be misleading, as it would conceal  the  role  of the  change  in  relative  prices.  Indeed 
productivity in each sector should be compared with the product wage – yet the expectation is 
that  the  other  variables  affect  the  bargaining  power  of  workers  over  the  real  wage  as 
commonly expressed as purchasing power in terms of the wage basket, which is the target of 
wage bargaining. I shall therefore follow the unusual procedure of deflating value added per 
worker  by  the  consumer  price  index,  thus  taking  account  of  the  possible  constraints  to 
bargaining in manufacturing coming not only from productivity growth as it is customarily 
defined, but also from the changes in relative prices highlighted by the previous analysis. 
Indeed, non reported results show that productivity thus measured has a higher coefficient and 
statistical significance than when it is taken in the usual form. To take account of the changes 
undergone in labour market de-regulation, a variable consisting of the ratio of short term   19 
labour contracts to the whole of employment in the economy is also introduced.
18 Table 1 
reports the results of simple regression analysis where the variables are taken in the form of 3-
year moving averages in order to smooth out the variability related to cyclical factors as well 
as  spurious  elements,  particularly  the  timing  of  the  renewal  of  labour  contracts.  In  one 
specification I also add dummies for 69-71, which were years of exceptionally high union 
militancy and wage explosion; for 1976-81, to take into account the influence of restructuring 
in large firms, which were at the core of union militancy and strength, as well as of the 
political  situation  briefly  described  above;
19  and  1993-2006,  when  the  above  mentioned 
changes in labour market regulation were introduced. The regression results are very good, 
and confirm the statistical and economic significance of all the variables considered.
20  
 
                                                 
18 The available series however is unsatisfactory, since it starts in 1993, while forms of short term contracts 
already existed and were used before; in addition, it takes into account one type only of short term contracts, 
while several forms of non standard labour contracts were introduced during the 1990s. 
19 In that period there is also a significant divergence between unemployment as was then measured by national 
statistics and as it results from the unemployment series revised according to the more restrictive Eurostat 
definition used in the regression. So it may be the case that the variable used in the regression underestimates 
unemployment in those years. 
20 The DW test is just below the indeterminacy range: this reflects a slightly greater cyclical variability of the 
real variable vis a vis the predicted (see the graphical representation in the Appendix). To some extent this may 
be due to the fact that employment data expressed in full time equivalent units are available only since the   20 
Overall,  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  institutional  changes  and  the  labour  market 
variables  considered,  together  with  changes  in  value  added  per  worker  in  terms  of  the 
consumer price index account for the changes in wages growth rates over a long period of 
time.  
 
5. Comparing Major European Countries. 
 
In this last section I shall compare the major economies in the euro-area - Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain - to check for similarities and differences, and verify whether the 





The  trends  in  the  aggregate  adjusted  wage  share  are  very  similar  in  the  timing  and 
direction of the changes (figure 8), though since the 1990s Italy has performed much worse 
than the others in terms of the size of the change. There is however greater diversity in the 
wage share in manufacturing (figure 9), particularly in the case of Germany: in this country 
the  wage  share  declines  only  for  a  limited  number  of  years  between  1981-1986,  and 
subsequently between 1996 and 2006 (after an upward jump in 1992, which coincides with 
the shift in the data series from West Germany alone to Germany as a whole), while in Italy, 
                                                                                                                                                       
seventies; but compensation per head (rather than per FTE unit) over the cycle resents also of the pro-cyclical   21 
Spain and France in the mid-70s-early 1980s begins a long-term decline, which continues till 
2000 with a brief interruption in the years of cyclical expansion between 1990 and 1992. 
After 2000 France and Italy exhibit an increase in the wage share, which in France is due to a 





                                                                                                                                                       
changes in hours worked. Heteroskedasticity is rejected and the residuals are distributed with mean zero.   22 
 
 
In Germany there is no long-term increase in the consumer price index compared with 
manufacturing  deflator  until  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  but  afterwards  it  follows  a  path 
similar to that of other countries (figure 10). 
More  interestingly,  however,  in  Germany  and  France  there  is  no  long-term  tendency 
towards an increase of margins in business service sector relative to manufacturing until 2000, 
while they increase in Italy and Spain (figure 11). After 2000 there is a very fast and marked 
growth in the proportion between service and manufacturing margins in all countries, which is 
to a large extent determined by rising rents in the real estate sector (figure 12).  
   23 
 
 
 The increase in margins is mirrored in the decline in the adjusted wage share in the 
business  sector  services,  which  over  the  entire  period  is  much  less  marked  in  Germany, 
followed by France, than in Italy  (figure 13). 
   24 
 
 
Overall, these data are consistent with the idea that changes in relative prices may have 
had a role in the decline in the wage share in manufacturing, with the case of Germany also 
confirming that one of the causes of this change may have been the pressure of international 
competition  on  manufacturing  prices,  since  Germany  has  outpaced  Italy  and  Spain  in 
manufacturing productivity growth since the early 1990s and France since 2000, and has thus 
experienced  a  tendency  towards  real  depreciation  vis-à-vis  the  other  major  European 
countries. However, it can also be noted that since 2000 Germany has become more similar to 
the other countries in terms of changes in income shares and service vis- à-vis manufacturing 
sector margins. It may be the case that in the latter period, despite the better productivity 
performance  with  respect  to  the  other  major  European  countries,  external  pressures  on 
manufacturing firms were increasingly caused by competition on international markets from 
non-European countries. 
With regard to the variables affecting real wage growth in manufacturing, table 2 reports 
the results of a simple regression exercise where the independent variables are unemployment 
rate, employment growth in manufacturing and value added per worker measured (except for 
Spain) in terms of the cost of living index;
21 as before, all variables are three-year moving 
averages. Dummies have been added for episodes in which the actual rate of growth of wages 
                                                 
21 The reasons for this are explained above: 16-17   25 
departed significantly from the trend predicted by the regression. The results indicate that in 
Spain and Germany either unemployment or employment growth, or both, as well as, in the 
case  of  Germany,  productivity,
  22  have  had  a  significant  role,  similarly  with  the  results 
obtained for Italy.
23 As shown by the dummies, other factors as well have been very important 
at particular junctures.  
In the case of France, although there is a significant correlation between unemployment 
and real wage growth, the overall regression results are not significant. One might conjecture 
that the existence of a legal minimum wage, the increase of which is partly related to what 
happens  to  actual  wages,
24  and  partly  to  economic  policy  decisions,  may  have  caused  a 
difference in the factors affecting wage fixing in this country with respect to the others.  
In all cases, the existence of differences across countries in the weight and statistical 
significance of the variables indicates the importance of country-specific institutional and 
social conditions. 
                                                 
22 For Germany and France, as for Italy, non reported results show that productivity in terms of the cost of living 
index is more statistically significant and has higher coefficients than when measured in terms of the 
manufacturing deflator. For Spain however available data did not allow constructing this series and value added 
per worker at constant prices was used instead. 
23 For Spain and Germany heteroskedasticity is rejected and residuals have mean zero. The DW test for Spain is 
indeterminate but the Breush-Godfrey test rejects serial correlation. The latter instead exists for Germany, where 
actual wage growth is slightly more pro-cyclical that the estimated variable. The reason might be the same as 
was discussed for Italy (see fn 18 above), since the employment series expressed in full time equivalents is 
available for Germany only since 1990. 
24 Since it is established as a rule that it must grow at least as much as half the increase in actual hourly wages   26 




Along  with  institutional  factors,  labour  market  variables  appear  to  have  had  a  role  in 
determining the trends in real wages that underlie the changes in income shares in Italy as 
well as in other European countries. This points to mutual interdependence between income 
distribution and unemployment of a nature entirely different from that normally assumed in 
mainstream  models.  Such  interdependence  rests  on  the  Keynesian  link,  mentioned  in  the 
introduction, between income distribution and effective demand formation on the one hand, 
and  a  Classical-Marxian  relation  between  labour  market  conditions  and  the  bargaining 
position of workers on the other. This suggests that economic policies aimed at improving 
income distribution or sustaining aggregate demand and employment would be more effective 
if they addressed both issues together. The influence of labour market conditions on wages 
also suggests that in the current crisis further changes in distribution unfavourable to labour 
are most likely to occur. Policy intervention and institutional reforms in the area of industrial 
relations and labour market regulation opposite in sign to those pursued in previous decades 
therefore appear to be in order to preserve or increase the wage share, which in turn could 
contribute  to  sustaining  aggregate  demand  and  would  enhance  the  impact  of  public 
expenditure packages adopted in many countries to counteract the current crisis. The analysis 
also suggests that, along with the changes mentioned above and the redistribution of income 
by means of taxation policy, another tool for improving workers’ purchasing power could be 
that  of  price  and  tariff  controls  in  the  sectors  (including  real  estate)  not  exposed  to 
international competition in product markets. 
The  simple  analysis  carried  out  here  does  not  allow  any  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
concerning the relative contribution to the deterioration of labour market conditions and slow 
wage growth of factors such as capital market liberalization (as emphasized for example in 
ILO, 2008; Jayadev 2007), labour market de-regulation and macroeconomic policies carried 
out in advanced economies and European countries in particular (Unctad, 2001; ILO 2008), or 
the  processes  of  globalization  in  product  (Stockhammer,  2009)  and  labour  markets.  The 
question  is  important  for  policy-making,  and  is  open  to  further  empirical  investigations 
carried out in a non main-stream perspective. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Statistical analysis and graphical representations of Equations 4 in tables 1 






Dependent Variable: REAL     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/10/10   Time: 12:17     
Sample: 1962 2006     
Included observations: 45     
         
            Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.762149  0.795519  5.986217  0.0000 
UNEMPLOYMENT  -0.267739  0.099125  -2.701013  0.0103 
VA/L over CPI  0.263283  0.075825  3.472238  0.0013 
EMPLOYEES  0.568563  0.103675  5.484102  0.0000 
DUMMY_69_71  2.316978  0.580752  3.989616  0.0003 
DUMMY_76_81  -2.062879  0.403371  -5.114093  0.0000 
DUMMY93_2006  -1.792370  0.422158  -4.245729  0.0001 
         
          R-squared  0.914835     Mean dependent var  2.810494 
Adjusted R-squared  0.901388     S.D. dependent var  2.754813 
S.E. of regression  0.865081     Akaike info criterion  2.690048 
Sum squared resid  28.43788     Schwarz criterion  2.971084 
Log likelihood  -53.52607     Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.794815 
F-statistic  68.03225     Durbin-Watson stat  1.154319 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         









Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
          F-statistic  1.001199     Prob. F(6,38)  0.4388 
Obs*R-squared  6.142717     Prob. Chi-Square(6)  0.4074 
Scaled explained SS  9.186297     Prob. Chi-Square(6)  0.1634 
         




Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
           32 
F-statistic  4.059150     Prob. F(1,37)  0.0512 
Obs*R-squared  4.448747     Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.0349 
         
                   
Test Equation:     
Dependent Variable: RESID     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/10/10   Time: 16:32     
Sample: 1962 2006     
Included observations: 45     
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
         
            Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  -0.023524  0.765399  -0.030735  0.9756 
UNEMPLOYMENT  0.015691  0.095679  0.164001  0.8706 
VA/L over CPI  -0.022294  0.073780  -0.302165  0.7642 
EMPLOYEES  0.027102  0.100641  0.269295  0.7892 
DUMMY_69_71  0.054617  0.559356  0.097643  0.9227 
DUMMY_76_81  -0.033099  0.388401  -0.085217  0.9325 
DUMMY93_2006  -0.142402  0.412232  -0.345441  0.7317 
RESID(-1)  0.325790  0.161704  2.014733  0.0512 
         
          R-squared  0.098861     Mean dependent var  2.22E-16 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.071625     S.D. dependent var  0.803937 
S.E. of regression  0.832230     Akaike info criterion  2.630396 
Sum squared resid  25.62648     Schwarz criterion  2.951581 
Log likelihood  -51.18392     Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.750131 
F-statistic  0.579879     Durbin-Watson stat  1.606152 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.767656       
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GERMANY
Dependent Variable: REAL_COMPENSATION   
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/10/10   Time: 16:38     
Sample: 1962 2006     
Included observations: 45     
         
         
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
         
C  3.284871  0.402368  8.163858  0.0000 
GDPXPERS_CPI  0.462857  0.057246  8.085450  0.0000 
UN  -0.353165  0.057019  -6.193792  0.0000 
EMPLOYEES  -0.135657  0.058757  -2.308773  0.0263 
DUMMY95  3.508269  0.828391  4.235038  0.0001 
DUMMY_69_71  3.049536  0.523078  5.829980  0.0000 
         
         
R-squared  0.893177     Mean dependent var  2.752152 
Adjusted R-squared  0.879482     S.D. dependent var  2.266557 
S.E. of regression  0.786851     Akaike info criterion  2.482010 
Sum squared resid  24.14625     Schwarz criterion  2.722899 
Log likelihood  -49.84523     Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.571811 
F-statistic  65.21817     Durbin-Watson stat  1.063720 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         












Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
         
          F-statistic  0.690243     Prob. F(5,39)  0.6338 
Obs*R-squared  3.658429     Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.5996 
Scaled explained SS  2.493696     Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.7774 
         





Dependent Variable: REAL_COMPENSATION   
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/10/10   Time: 16:38     
Sample: 1962 2006     
Included observations: 45     
         
            Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  3.284871  0.402368  8.163858  0.0000 
GDPXPERS_CPI  0.462857  0.057246  8.085450  0.0000 
UN  -0.353165  0.057019  -6.193792  0.0000 
EMPLOYEES  -0.135657  0.058757  -2.308773  0.0263 
DUMMY95  3.508269  0.828391  4.235038  0.0001 
DUMMY_69_71  3.049536  0.523078  5.829980  0.0000 
         
          R-squared  0.893177     Mean dependent var  2.752152 
Adjusted R-squared  0.879482     S.D. dependent var  2.266557 
S.E. of regression  0.786851     Akaike info criterion  2.482010 
Sum squared resid  24.14625     Schwarz criterion  2.722899 
Log likelihood  -49.84523     Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.571811 
F-statistic  65.21817     Durbin-Watson stat  1.063720 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         








Dependent Variable: REAL_COMPENSATION   
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/11/10   Time: 18:06     
Sample: 1962 2006     
Included observations: 45     
         
         
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
         
C  4.478314  1.162715  3.851601  0.0004 
UNEMPLOYMENT  -0.483619  0.072568  -6.664337  0.0000 
EMPLOYEES  0.560228  0.108729  5.152513  0.0000 
VA/L at const. prices  0.126904  0.105000  1.208613  0.2341 
DUMMY 88_92  5.475516  0.845873  6.473211  0.0000 
DUMMY 76_78  -6.410918  1.132380  -5.661453  0.0000 
         
         
R-squared  0.878341     Mean dependent var  0.875440 
Adjusted R-squared  0.862744     S.D. dependent var  4.606942 
S.E. of regression  1.706786     Akaike info criterion  4.030667 
Sum squared resid  113.6117     Schwarz criterion  4.271556 
Log likelihood  -84.69001     Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.120468 
F-statistic  56.31357     Durbin-Watson stat  1.346939 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
         




Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
         
         
F-statistic  2.944289     Prob. F(1,38)  0.0943 
Obs*R-squared  3.235934     Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.0720 
         
         
         
Test Equation:     
Dependent Variable: RESID     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/11/10   Time: 18:19     
Sample: 1962 2006     
Included observations: 45     
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
         
         
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
         
C  -0.003426  1.134775  -0.003019  0.9976 
EMPLOYEES  0.007986  0.106218  0.075187  0.9405 
UNEMPLOYMENT  0.001448  0.070829  0.020447  0.9838 
VA/L at const. prices  -0.002626  0.102488  -0.025625  0.9797 
DUMMY_76_78  0.136415  1.108023  0.123116  0.9027 
DUMMY88_92  -0.145912  0.829913  -0.175816  0.8614 
RESID(-1)  0.270683  0.157750  1.715893  0.0943 
         
         
R-squared  0.071910     Mean dependent var  -1.70E-16 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.074631     S.D. dependent var  1.606886 
S.E. of regression  1.665769     Akaike info criterion  4.000486 
Sum squared resid  105.4419     Schwarz criterion  4.281522 
Log likelihood  -83.01093     Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.105253 
F-statistic  0.490715     Durbin-Watson stat  1.865827 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.811149       
         







Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
         
         
F-statistic  0.881497     Prob. F(5,39)  0.5026 
Obs*R-squared  4.569183     Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.4707 
Scaled explained SS  2.663646     Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.7517 
         
         
         
Test Equation:     
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 06/11/10   Time: 18:20     
Sample: 1962 2006       37 
Included observations: 45     
         
         
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
         
C  1.927959  2.181777  0.883665  0.3823 
EMPLOYEES  -0.217722  0.204025  -1.067138  0.2925 
UNEMPLOYMENT  0.017797  0.136171  0.130695  0.8967 
VA/L at const.prices  0.190141  0.197027  0.965050  0.3405 
DUMMY 76_78  0.623663  2.124855  0.293508  0.7707 
DUMMY 88_92  -1.729891  1.587239  -1.089874  0.2825 
         
         
R-squared  0.101537     Mean dependent var  2.524703 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.013650     S.D. dependent var  3.181062 
S.E. of regression  3.202699     Akaike info criterion  5.289431 
Sum squared resid  400.0340     Schwarz criterion  5.530319 
Log likelihood  -113.0122     Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.379232 
F-statistic  0.881497     Durbin-Watson stat  1.585164 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.502589       
         
         
 
 
Residuals: 
 
 
 
 